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Introduzione
In questa tesi ho raccolto tre studi riguardanti l’economia compor-
tamentale in situazioni decisionali di gruppo. Gli esperimenti in lab-
oratorio, con i quali manteniamo il controllo del contesto specifico, ci
permettono di isolare i fenomeni oggetto di studio.
Nel primo capitolo, studiamo come la giustizia distributiva influenza
la fiducia tra due individui. Una relazione spesso inizia con la divisione di
un patrimonio di proprieta` comune. La giustizia distributiva di una divi-
sione puo` avere un’influenza sul successo della relazione. Questo capitolo
analizza l’effetto che una procedura di fair division ha su un legame di
fiducia tra due individui, confrontando due modificazioni del meccanismo
Divide & Choose (DC). Nella prima versione del DC, la divisione finale
del patrimonio rispecchia le intenzioni sociali del divisore; invece nella
seconda versione del DC, a seguito di una divisione equa del patrimonio
non e` possibile intuire le attitudini egoistiche o sociali del partner. I dati
sperimentali evidenziano che, indipendentemente dal meccanismo utiliz-
zato, le coppie che ottengono una divisione equa nella prima fase esibis-
cono un maggiore livello di fiducia reciproca nella seconda fase. Pertanto,
dalla fase di divisione, i soggetti non estraggono e usano razionalmente
le informazioni riguardanti le intenzioni sociali del partner. I risultati
suggeriscono che una divisione equa crea un atteggiamento positivo, il
quale favorisce la fiducia all’interno della coppia, anche nel caso non sia
possibile dedurre le predisposizioni sociali dell’altro membro della coppia.
Il secondo capitolo illustra un metodo per misurare la motivazione
intrinseca in ambiente lavorativo. In seguito, usando questa misura, ap-
profondiamo come le motivazioni intrinseche si relazionano con gli incen-
tivi estrinsechi. La performance dei dipendenti in un ambiente di lavoro e`
originata da molteplici fattori. In contrasto con l’economia classica, molti
esperimenti economici hanno dimostrato che il denaro non e` l’unica mo-
tivazione che sta dietro allo sforzo di un lavoratore. In un ambiente lavo-
rativo dove gli individui devono compiere una mansione, e` fondamentale
per il datore di lavoro capire la motivazione intrinseca verso il compito
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affidato al dipendente e l’appagamento personale che quest’ultimo ne puo`
trarre. Abbiamo disegnato un esperimento innovativo che ci permette di
misurare la motivazione intrinseca sul lavoro. Nel nostro esperimento,
nel quale anche il tempo non lavorativo e` salariato, comunichiamo ai
partecipanti qual e` il tempo ottimale di lavoro. Cio` significa che spieghi-
amo esplicitamente ai partecipanti come possono massimizzare il loro
profitto monetario. La motivazione intrinseca viene definita come la dif-
ferenza tra il livello di performance osservato e il livello ottimale basato
sugli incentivi monetari (estrinsechi) durante lo svolgimento di un com-
pito, in un contesto dove i lavoratori possono essere monitorati. Lo scopo
dell’esperimento e` di utilizzare la nostra misura di motivazione intrinseca
per predire la performance dei lavoratori in un ambiente lavorativo non
monitorato. I dati dimostrano che i lavoratori con una bassa produttivita`
hanno una motivazione intrinseca inferiore rispetto ai piu` produttivi; i
lavoratori con un’alta produttivita` attuano uno sforzo superiore al loro
tempo ottimale (in termini monetari) di lavoro.
Infine, il terzo capitolo, analizza l’effetto dell’identita` sociale sulla
distribuzione di ricchezza. Abbiamo progettato un esperimento, dove
sono coinvolti tre individui e due di questi appartengono allo stesso
gruppo sociale. Chi ha potere decisionale puo` scegliere di distribuire
equamente la ricchezza a sua disposizione tra i tre individui, oppure puo`
preferire un’allocazione che favorisce se stesso e il soggetto esterno al suo
gruppo, creando pero` uno svantaggio per l’altro membro del gruppo. In
questo capitolo studiamo i potenziali determinanti di lealta` verso il pro-
prio gruppo sociale, variando nell’esperimento le identita` sociali (basate
sul paradigma dei gruppi minimi) e i livelli di status sociale (basati su
una misura di abilita` cognitive). Inoltre, variamo le opportunita` di in-
fliggere punizioni da parte del soggetto che riceve uno svantaggio nella
distribuzione della ricchezza. I risultati indicano che persino identita` so-
ciali molto deboli hanno un effetto sull’efficienza. Quando una scelta effi-
ciente significa danneggiare il proprio gruppo, gli individui sono propensi
a scegliere la distribuzione equa ma inefficiente, perfino supportando un
costo personale. Piu` alto e` lo status sociale del gruppo e maggiore diventa
il problema dell’inefficienza.
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Introduction
This thesis is a collection of three studies concerning behavioral eco-
nomics in group decision contexts. Laboratory experiments are our main
tool to maintain control over the specific settings that we want to analyze
and they allow us to isolate the phenomena we are interested in.
In the first chapter, we look at how fairness influences trust between
two individuals. A relationship frequently begins with the act of split-
ting a common endowment. The fairness of this division may influence
the success of the relationship. This chapter investigates the effects of a
fair division mechanism on an ongoing trusting relationship between two
partners, by comparing two different Divide & Choose (DC) procedures.
In the first version of the DC mechanism, the division is informative
in terms of the pro-social intentions of the divider, whereas in the sec-
ond version an equal division is consistent both with self-interest and
other-regarding concerns. The experimental data find that, irrespective
of the mechanism used, couples who reach an equal division in the first
phase show higher levels of trust in the second phase. Hence, subjects
do not rationally extract and use the information about the intentions of
their partner from the division phase. The results suggest that reaching
an equal division creates a positive feeling that enhances trust between
the couple, even when it is not possible to deduce the intentions of the
partner.
In the second chapter, we are able to create a measure of intrinsic
motivation in a working environment; and then, using this measure, we
investigate how intrinsic motivations interact with extrinsic incentives.
The effort of workers in a labor context is motivated by multiple factors.
In contrast with the classical economic view, several economic exper-
iments showed that money is not the unique motivation behind their
effort. In a working context where subjects have to perform a task, it
becomes fundamental for the employer to understand the intrinsic moti-
vation and the taste for the task employees should perform. We develop
a novel experiment to provide an empirical measure of intrinsic motiva-
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tion at work. In our experiment, with rewarded leisure time, we tell the
subjects which one is the optimal working time and consequently how
they can maximize their monetary profit. We define intrinsic motivation
as the difference between the level of effort actually exerted and the one
optimally chosen based on monetary (extrinsic) incentives in a real ef-
fort task with complete monitoring of workers. The experiment aims at
validating our motivation measure in terms of predictive success in work
environments without monitoring of workers. Our data show that low
productive workers have lower intrinsic motivation than high productive
workers; high productive workers over provide effort working more than
their optimal (in monetary terms) working time.
In the third chapter, we analyze the effect of social identity on wealth
distribution. We design a three-agent experiment in which two agents
belong to the same social group. The decision maker can choose either
an allocation that maintains equal payoffs between the three agents, or
an allocation that favors himself and the other non-member individual
at a cost for the member of his group. We study potential determinants
of loyalty by imposing experimental variation in group identity (based
on the minimal group paradigm) and status (based on a measure of
cognitive ability). Furthermore, we vary punishment opportunities of
those who receive a disadvantage from the distribution of wealth. Our
results indicate that even very weak group identities have a strong effect
on efficiency. When efficiency means hurting the ingroup, subjects tend
to choose the inefficient equal distribution even at a personal cost. The
higher is the status of the group, the bigger is the inefficiency problem.
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Chapter 1
An experimental study of
allocation procedures and
their effect on trust
Diana Gaspari
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CHAPTER 1. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ALLOCATION
PROCEDURES AND THEIR EFFECT ON TRUST
1.1 Introduction
Two companies interested in forming a joint venture must begin their
relationship with a negotiation phase. In this preliminary phase, they
negotiate not only how to share the gain of the partnership, but also how
to divide their assets if the relationship is terminated. Similarly, in a
marriage, spouses often sign a prenuptial contract, which also determines
how they split their endowments in the case of divorce.
In this context, it is interesting to study how the outcome of the
first negotiation phase affects the parties’ incentives to invest in the re-
lationship. The initial negotiation phase, in fact, may not only directly
influence the incentives to invest in the relationship to establish the prop-
erty rights on the future gains, but may also reveal the intentions of the
parties and their mutual benevolence. In this work we are interested in
analyzing this second aspect, and in particular, whether a fair outcome
or a fair behavior is more important to enhance trust in the ongoing
relationship.
To this aim, we study experimentally how the division of a common
endowment affects the outcome of a subsequent relationship between
two subjects. The experiment is composed of two unrelated phases. In
the first phase, two subjects divide a common property without being
informed that they will play another game in the second phase with
the same partner. In the second phase, they play a Trust Game. We
design two treatments to distinguish whether it is more effective a fair
division, even if it imposed by the rules of the game, or a fair behavior,
when agents can choose between picking a favorable outcome or a more
equitable division. In the first treatment, we use an allocation mechanism
which, in the event of a final fair allocation, the pro-social intentions of
the first mover (divider) are clearly revealed. In the second treatment,
the fair outcome does not reveal anything about the fair intentions of the
divider.
The two allocation procedures provide different information about
the motivations behind the other subject’s choice. One mechanism is
“informative” in the sense that the fair intention for fair division is ev-
ident; the other mechanism does not have this property. In this way,
we can analyze how the partner’s revealed preferences affect the level of
investment in a relationship.
Marriages with prenuptial agreements and the allocation of control
rights at the beginning of a business partnership are two relevant ex-
amples of relationships that are initiated with a division phase. The
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literature on assets ownership, starting from Grossman and Hart (1986),
mainly studies the effects of the ownership structure on incentives to
invest during the relationship. Typically, the ownership structure is de-
cided at the beginning through a negotiation process; in marriages for
instance, negotiation takes place while writing the prenuptial agreement.
Classical theoretical studies assume that subjects are pure profit maxi-
mizers. In this work, we aim at analyzing the role of social preferences
in determining the incentives to invest.
Let us consider the marriage example in more detail. Beside the
romantic part, there is also the tedious but fundamental issue of the di-
vision of tasks and rights between the spouses. Marriage, of course, is an
incomplete contract since it is clearly impossible to check and evaluate
the effort of the partners in every daily activity. The incompleteness of
the marriage contract, together with the increase in divorce rates in the
last decades, have caused the spread of prenuptial agreements, especially
in the case of second or third marriages (Pilon 2010). The increasing pop-
ularity of these contracts have attracted the attentions of some theorists.
Rainer (2007) develops a model that determines the equilibrium condi-
tions that assure the efficiency of the prenuptial agreement with respect
to the default options of divorce as provided by law. He concludes that
equality of divorce payoffs evenly shares the powers within the relation-
ship, since no one can strategically exploit divorce as a threat. Therefore,
the incentives for both partners to invest are not undermined by the fear
of deception. However, when also considering social interactions, both
distributional preferences and intentions influence the behavior of sub-
jects; individuals do not only react to the final outcome of the division,
but can also read the motives behind the choices of the other person and
respond to them.
Another relevant situation where a relationship begins with the act
of splitting an endowment is the business partnership. The companies
interested in creating an alliance must negotiate at the onset the control
of assets. The result of this first stage is written in a document called
a partnership agreement. Only after this initial phase does the business
relationship between the two partners begin, and all the characteristics
of a working partnership determine the success of the alliance. Joint ven-
tures are spread throughout professional services industries, where joint
knowledge can produce significant advantages for both partners. In this
particular context, it is clear that trust should be at the inception of the
relationship since the individual contribution is quite impossible to mon-
itor. In their empirical study, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) report that joint
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ventures with an equal division of control have a higher success rate and
a longer life. In contrast, in cases of unequal shares, the majority holder
can misuse the greater power and destroy the other partner. They ex-
plain that this evidence is based on mutual responsibility. When shares
are equal, both parties are responsible for the success of the other; thus,
because of this dependency, the likelihood of cheating is decreased. The
present study will expand on their ideas by focussing deeply on the allo-
cation process, and on the effect of fairness derived from the first stage
within the relationship.
Our work is also related with the literature of signaling and rep-
utation. This wide branch of research introduces reputation concerns
to explain costly behaviors that benefit other subjects, such as charita-
ble donations, volunteering, or simply refraining from being selfish. The
main idea behind the theoretical models (Benabou and Tirole 2003, 2006;
Bernheim 1994; Corneo 1997; Seabright 2004) is that pro-social behaviors
are not only driven by distributional preferences, as altruism or inequality
aversion, but subjects also value the self-image that they convey towards
their social group (Benabou and Tirole 2006). There could be multiple
reasons for this; having a reputation of being a pro-social type could be
simply a strategy to induce cooperation in subsequent relations, thus in-
creasing the monetary payoff in the long run; or, it could be a means to
avoid bad feelings about oneself and enhance one’s self-esteem.
Signaling models often refer to subsequent relationships inside the
social group of the subject; for example, blood could be donated because
of altruism, warm glow or reputation building, even without the need of
specifying the next encounter of the donor with another member of the
community. Our work deals with exactly these kinds of contexts. Our
subjects are in a situation where they are meeting each other in the first
phase, but do not know if there will be another encounter in the future.
In any case, concerns about one’s reputation could have an influence on
their choices.
More about this topic can be found in the experimental literature
about the spill-over effect between unrelated games. Most of the experi-
mental literature that investigates social preferences mainly focusses on
one specific game and on how subjects react inside that particular circum-
stance. However, when subjects sequentially take unconnected decisions,
behaviors could be affected by the previous games even if the situations
are unrelated. In the last decade, some papers expanded the research
outside a single decisional framing to also consider the spillover effect
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among dissimilar games. The most significant research studies the effect
of previous decisions on cooperation. For instance, Knez and Camerer
(2000) show that coordination in Weak-link Games improves cooperation
in a finite horizon Prisoner’s Dilemma; Shotter (1999) tests the effect of
Minimum and Median Game on a profit sharing contract; and Cason
and Gangadharan (2010) find that when the same subjects operate in
the same period in a cooperative environment and in a competitive one,
cooperation decreases. Other works investigate the spillover effect of
learning and rationality. In particular, Mengel and Sciubba (2010) claim
that similar games can transfer the learning effect from one to the other.
Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren (2003) and Cherry and Shogren (2007)
show that rationality, in terms of preference reversals, can be enhanced
in a market setting, and that the same individuals are able to transfer it
to non-market contexts.
The present work considers a different area of interest. It investigates
the spillover effect of information conveyed by fairness on trust between
two subjects. A study of similar inspiration, that focuses on the role of
information and reputation, is the paper of Albert et al. (2007). In their
experiment, they use a first phase where subjects may donate to a charity;
the individual donation then contributes to the total amount donated by
a predetermined group of subjects. In the second stage, subjects are
randomly paired and are only given the aggregate information about the
donations of their partner’s group in the first phase. At this point, they
play a Prisoner’s Dilemma or a Trust Game. In both cases, the authors
find that there is a spillover effect between the two phases; in particular,
they claim that “people are nicer to nicer people”. In this frame it is not
possible to distinguish if the positive effect of donation comes from the
underlying fair intentions of the partner or from the general good feeling
generated by fairness. Our work wants to clarify this distinction using
two mechanisms that generate fair allocations, but supply different levels
of information about pro-social intentions.
The results of our experiment show that “allocation fairness” in this
setting is the most important driver of trust independent of information
that subjects can acquire from the fair allocation. This suggests that the
positive feeling gained by fairness positively influences the level of trust
regardless of the information obtained from a fair division. Therefore,
even if a fair choice does not mirror a fair strategy, the effect on trust is
still positive.
This kind of behavior seems to follow the same rationale of a framing
effect. It is well known that the way a situation is described influences
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individual’s decisions in that moment; for example, Liberman, Samuels,
and Ross (2004) show that there is an increase of cooperation in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma when it is called Community Game rather than Wall
Street Game. It could happen that having just experienced fairness cre-
ates a generally pleasant feeling that alters behaviors. However in our
setting, fairness in the first phase of the experiment should also convey
some information and, subsequently, modify beliefs. On the contrary our
data do not find a significative role of information about the social pref-
erence of the partner in the following Trust Game. An explanation could
come from the study of Nagel (1995), which shows that subjects do not
possess very deep strategic reasoning, especially in non-repeated games.
In the first repetition of Nagel’s Guessing Game, the majority of subjects
did not exceed iteration step two, where step zero means random play
and step one represents the best response to step zero strategies. In light
of Nagel (1995)’s results, the inability to use information efficiently could
come from a superficial strategic reasoning by the subjects; therefore, to
enhance trust in a subsequent relationship, the framing effect of fairness
becomes more important than the updating of beliefs.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 describes the Fair
Division mechanisms and the Trust Game used in the experiment, their
properties and the theoretical hypotheses; section 1.3 presents the pro-
cedural details of the experiment; and section 1.4 shows the analysis of
the results.
1.2 The Experiment
The aim of this study is to test how two different Fair Division mecha-
nisms affect trust in a subsequent unrelated interaction between the same
couple. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects deal with a Fair
Division problem; in the second phase, they play a Trust Game similar
to the one presented by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995).
The experiment is composed of two treatments which differ in the first
phase. In both treatments, subjects are matched in pairs that remain
unchanged during the two phases.
1.2.1 Phase one: Allocation Mechanisms
In the first phase of the experiment the members of a couple have
to split a jointly owned endowment by means of the so-called Divide
& Choose mechanism. This mechanism is composed of two stages: in
12
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Table 1.1: Subjects’ values
subject α subject β
Good A Aα = 9 Aβ = 2
Good B Bα = 2 Bβ = 9
10 coins (1 coin c = 1) 10c = 10 10c = 10
Total value Tα = 21 Tβ = 21
stage one, the first mover, the Divider, divides the endowment into two
portions; in stage two, the second mover, the Chooser, chooses one of the
two portions, and the other is assigned to the Divider.
The two treatments of the experiment differ in the method used to
assign the roles of Divider and Chooser. In the first treatment, named
RandomDC, the roles are randomly assigned, and in the second treat-
ment, named AuctionDC, they are assigned through an auction. This
simple modification fundamentally changes the properties of the mecha-
nism.
In both treatments, the common endowment is composed of two in-
divisible goods and an amount of coins: good A, good B and 10 coins
(single coins are also indivisible). The value of the goods is different for
the two subjects, whereas the value of the coins is the same. The goods’
evaluation is common information and, therefore, agents play a complete
information game. Table 1.1 shows the value of the goods and coins used
in the experiment; the subjects’ values were preset such that the value
of the total endowment was the same for both subjects. Each subject is
informed about his own and his partner’s value.
Roles assigned randomly - RandomDC
In the RandomDC treatment, the couple’s roles of Divider and Chooser
are randomly assigned before the start of the game.
Assuming that the individual utility function comprises only the mon-
etary payoff, the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE). Proceeding by backward induction in stage two, the Chooser
selects the portion that maximizes her1 personal outcome; in the case of
1In this chapter, we use the convention that the first mover is male and the second
mover is female.
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Table 1.2: All possible proposals of allocation
Portion 1 Portion 2
Good A + Good B + x 10-x
Good A + x Good B + (10-x)
Good B + x Good A + (10-x)
x Good A + Good B + (10-x)
x ∈ [0, 10]=number of coins allocated in portion 1
indifference, she chooses the allocation that maximizes the outcome of the
Divider. Anticipating the Chooser’s behavior, in stage one, the Divider
maximizes his profit by proposing the envy-free2 allocation that makes
the Chooser indifferent between the two portions. In the experiment, the
values are set to avoid perfect indifference; therefore, the Divider pro-
poses the division that is closer to the allocation that makes the Chooser
indifferent.
Considering our parametrization of the experiment, the outcomes re-
sulting from the SPNE prediction assuming selfish behaviors are:
pid = Aα + 8c = 17
pic = Bβ + 2c = 11,
where pi stands for earnings (in experimental currency), and subscripts
d and c for Divider and Chooser.
This allocation is ex-post asymmetric, in the sense that the individual
outcome depends on the role assigned to the subject.3 In fact, in the case
of complete information, the Divider has an advantage over the Chooser
and he can obtain a larger fraction of the value of the entire endowment.
Experimental evidence indicates that subjects are not always inter-
ested in the maximization of their own monetary payoff. They also care
also about the well-being of others, showing some kinds of social prefer-
ences.4
2The allocation is envy-free if both players do not envy the portion received by
the other player.
3Due to randomness of roles, the mechanism is ex-ante symmetric in terms of
expected payoffs.
4See, for example, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad
(2007); Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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Thus, subjects endowed with other-regarding preferences could sys-
tematically deviate from the SPNE prediction based on selfishness. If
the Divider is inequality averse, for example, he will choose the alloca-
tion that assures the same outcome for both members of the couple; in
this case, the outcomes will be pid = Aα+5c = 14 and pic = Bβ+5c = 14.
Beside the equal and the selfish allocations, there are also other plausible
no-envy and efficient outcomes that lie in-between the two extremes just
mentioned. The full range of possible allocation proposals can be derived
from the four cases described in Table 1.2, and the outcome predictions
derived from the no-envy solutions when subject α is the Divider (d) as
presented in Table 3.3.
In this mechanism, depending on personal social preferences, the Di-
vider could choose one of the efficient and no-envy allocations just pre-
sented. Therefore, a selfish Divider will propose the no-envy allocation
that maximizes his monetary payoff, and a subject with pro-social inten-
tion will choose one of the other solutions according to the shape of his
utility function (efficiency requires that good A is assigned to subject α
in all these allocations).
The freedom of choice given by the mechanism also conveys some
information about the Divider’s preferences. By just looking at the pro-
posed portions, the Chooser will infer something about his social prefer-
ences. For this reason we will refer to the treatment RandomDC as the
“informative treatment”.
Roles assigned by an auction - AuctionDC
The second mechanism solves the ex-post inequality problem of the
RandomDC when assuming selfishness. In the first stage, instead of a
random assignment, subjects have to bid at a first price auction to win
the role of Divider. The procedure is similar to the Bidding to be Divider
by Crawford (1979).
In this treatment, the roles are determined by an auction rather than
by a random device; subject α and subject β submit a bid between 0
and 5 (only integers); whoever wins the auction becomes the Divider. At
the end of the game, the amount bid by the winner of the auction (the
Divider) will be transferred to the loser (the Chooser). If both subjects
bid the same number, a random mechanism determines the winner of the
auction.
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Table 1.3: Outcome predictions of the allocation phase when subject α
is the Divider (d)
RandomDC
pid pic
Aα + 8c = 17 Bβ + 2c = 11 selfish
Aα + 7c = 16 Bβ + 3c = 12
Aα + 6c = 15 Bβ + 4c = 13
Aα + 5c = 14 Bβ + 5c = 14 equal
Aα + 4c = 13 Bβ + 7c = 16
Aα + 3c = 12 Bβ + 6c = 15
Aα + 2c = 11 Bβ + 8c = 17 altruistic
AuctionDC
pid pic
Aα + 8c− bα = 17− 3 = 14 Bβ + 2c+ bα = 11 + 3 = 14 selfish
Aα + 8c− bα = 17− 3 = 14 Bβ + 2c+ bα = 11 + 3 = 14 equal
The RandomDC version of the Divide & Choose shows that in the
unique SPNE with selfish players, the Divider earns 17 and the Chooser
11. Thus, the Divider has an advantage of 6 over the Chooser; this
amount also represents the maximum rational bid in the auction stage
of any SPNE of the mechanism when subjects are selfish.
Starting from the assumption of maximization of the monetary payoff,
in this second game there is a unique SPNE. In stage two, the Chooser
takes the portion that maximizes her monetary payoff; in the case of
indifference, we assume that she chooses the allocation that maximizes
the outcome of the Divider. In stage one, the Divider, knowing the
behavior of the Chooser in stage two, maximizes his profit by proposing
the envy-free allocation that makes the Chooser indifferent between the
two portions. In the auction stage, both subjects bid an amount that
corresponds to half of the Divider’s advantage of the allocation stage and
a random mechanism assigns the roles.
The outcomes resulting from the selfish SPNE prediction are pre-
sented in Table 3.3. It is clear from the analysis of the equilibrium
outcomes that this second mechanism guarantees ex-post equality even
when both subjects are selfish.
However, as previously mentioned, the assumption that all subjects
want to maximize their monetary payoff is questionable in this kind of
game. A Divider strongly inequality averse, for instance, will equally split
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the endowment. Therefore, the optimal bid depends on the preferences
of the player.
It is easy in equilibrium to check that inequality averse subjects will
bid 3 points in the auction stage. Then, if he becomes the Divider, he
will propose the allocation that, after the transfer of the bid, guarantees
equality, which is exactly the same proposal of a selfish subject, as we can
see in the lower part of Table 3.3. If, instead, he becomes the Chooser,
he is sure that, even when facing a selfish Divider, the final allocation
will be equal.
Contrary to the RandomDC, this mechanism guarantees ex-post equal-
ity even in the case of selfish subjects, but on the other hand, the Chooser
cannot make any inference about the Divider’s preferences. The Divider
can no longer propose different divisions that mirror his selfish or pro-
social intentions. The mechanism AuctionDC does not permit the ac-
quisition of information about the Divider’s social preferences. For this
reason, the AuctionDC treatment will be named “uninformative treat-
ment”.
Assuming that the population is composed of subjects with differ-
ent social preferences, we can draw some hypotheses about the degree
of equality that the two mechanisms, RandomDC and AuctionDC, can
guarantee. First of all, we define the equality degree as the difference
between the payoffs of the two partners; we find the highest degree of
equality when the difference is zero and the two partners earn exactly
the same amount of points. The larger is the difference, and the lower is
the degree of equality.
The mechanism AuctionDC provides incentives for both selfish sub-
jects and those with pro-social preferences to choose an allocation that
equally splits the value of the endowment. On the contrary, in the mech-
anism RandomDC, Dividers with pro-social intentions choose the equal
allocation, whereas those who are selfish propose allocations with a lower
degree of equality. Therefore, considering the totality of the subjects,
the two mechanisms should generate different degrees of equality when
played by a sample that comes from a population with different types of
subjects.
In our first hypothesis, we look at the difference in the payoff of each
Divider/Chooser couple in the two treatments. Let Dt be the average
difference of the monetary payoff of the couples in treatment t for t =
{r = random, a = auction}.
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H1: The average difference D is lower in treatment
AuctionDC than in treatment RandomDC :
Da ≤ Dr
Hypothesis H1 wants to verify the degree of equality that the mech-
anisms can reach when applied to a random sample of the population.
The difference between the outcome of the Divider and the outcome of
the Chooser, named D, is the measure of equality of the mechanisms.
In this setting, D = 0 represents the highest degree of equality; in fact,
when the difference is equal to zero perfect equality is guaranteed. The
higher D is the bigger the inequality is between partners, thus raising
unfairness. Hypothesis H1 claims that the average D is smaller in the
AuctionDC mechanism since in this game all different types of subjects
head toward the same equal outcome.
1.2.2 Phase two: Trust Game
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects play a Trust Game
(Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). This subsequent phase of the ex-
periment is unrelated to the first one, i.e. subjects during the first phase
only know that there will be a second phase, but they do know what it
will be about.
The Trust Game is a sequential game that involves two subjects, the
Trustor (first mover) and the Trustee (second mover). Both subjects are
endowed with an amount M of money, but only the Trustor can decide
how much to invest (transfer) T ∈ [0,M ] by giving it to the Trustee. The
amount transferred is then tripled T ∗3 and the Trustee now decides how
much to give back to the Trustor X ∈ [0, 3T +M ].
The profit functions of the Trustor (r) and of the Trustee (e) are
respectively:
pir =M − T +X
pie =M + 3T −X
The SPNE of this game, assuming that subjects maximize their mon-
etary payoff, predicts T = 0 in stage one; in fact, anticipating a selfish
behavior of the Trustee X = 0, the Trustor does not invest anything.
Dropping the assumption of selfish behaviors, we could observe some
positive transfer T > 0, that measures our level of trust of the Trustor.
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The subjects in this second phase of the experiment are again assigned
the same partner from phase one. However, in this phase subjects make
decisions in both roles (strategy method), i.e. they act both as Trustor
and as Trustee.
A subject can face two different situations depending on his/her and
the partner’s role in the allocation phase (the first phase of the experi-
ment). In the event that the subject was the Divider in phase one, and
now he assumes the role of Trustor, he has no information about the
social preferences of the Chooser/Trustee. Nevertheless, if in phase one
the Divider has been “fair” to the Chooser offering more than the selfish
SPNE prediction, he might anticipate positive reciprocity of the Trustee
(Chooser), which induces him to invest more in the Trust Game. If, in-
stead, the subject was the Chooser in phase one and now she assumes the
role of Trustor, she could observe the Divider’s proposal and, depending
on the treatment, infer something about the social preferences of the
partner. If in phase one the Divider has been “fair” to the Chooser, the
Trustor (Chooser) now can decide to invest more, since the information
on the Trustee’s pro-social attitude helps to form positive beliefs of trust-
worthiness.
The existing literature on spillover effects between unrelated games
suggests that we should observe some differences in the level of trust be-
tween the two treatments. The different fairness and informative proper-
ties of the allocation mechanisms of phase one permit the identification
of which elements in the tradeoff between equality and information about
the intentions are more important in creating a trusty environment inside
the couple.
In the following hypothesis, named H2, the terms fair, self and altr
indicate strategies that lead to outcomes. For example, in the Ran-
domDC mechanism, a selfish strategy leads to an unequal outcome, and
in the AuctionDC, a selfish strategy generates the same equal outcome
as pro-social strategies. We categorize the Divider’s no-envy proposals5
in the three groups “selfish”, “fair” and “altruistic” following these crite-
ria: in “fair” are the proposals that almost equally split the endowment
(the difference between the monetary values is less or equal than two);
“selfish” are the proposals that induce a difference in the payoff greater
than two in favor of the Divider and, when the Chooser has an advance
5We only consider no-envy proposals because in equilibrium we should never ob-
serve an envy proposal. Indeed, in the experiment, 96% of the Divider’s proposals
(62 out of 70) satisfy this property.
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of more than two points on the Divider, the proposal is “altruistic”.
Let us define trust T as the amount invested in stage one of the Trust
Game by the Trustor, and the average level of trust of treatment t as T j
for t = {r = random, a = auction}.
H2: Conditional on the Divider’s proposal being “fair”,
the average amount invested by the Trustor is higher
in the RandomDC (r) treatment than in the Auc-
tionDC (a) treatment:
T fair,r > T fair,a
Conditional on the Divider’s proposal being “selfish”,
the average amount invested by the Trustor is higher
in the AuctionDC (a) treatment than in the Ran-
domDC (r) treatment:
T self,a > T self,r
Conditional on the Divider’s proposal being “altruis-
tic”, the average amount invested by the Trustor is
equal in the two treatments:
T altr,a = T altr,r
The level of trust depends on the beliefs that the Trustor forms look-
ing at the outcomes of the Divide & Choose. However, these outcomes
are produced by the choice of a strategy that is not directly observable.
The two treatments differ in the degree of information about social pref-
erences that the subjects acquire while observing the proposed and the
accepted allocation in phase one.
If a fair outcome is generated in both mechanisms, pro-social inten-
tions are identifiable only in RandomDC. The outcomes coming from
AuctionDC do not provide information about the social preference type
of the subjects, thus beliefs on trustworthiness are not influenced from
the AuctionDC allocation mechanism: T fair,a = T self,a. If the outcome
of the Divide & Choose is determined by a selfish strategy, the lowest
level of trust is generated by RandomDC since the selfish intentions are
clearly revealed. In the case of altruistic proposals, both treatments will
reveal information and, thus, have the same effect on trust.
The alternative hypothesis predicts no spillover effects between the
two phases of the experiment. In this case, the two decisional processes
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are completely independent, and fairness deriving from the allocation
phase has no influence on trust in the second phase.
The three cases presented in hypothesis H2 assume that the Chooser
always behaves efficiently, this means she chooses the portion containing
the more valuable good for herself. However, in the case of a Divider’s
unfair proposal, we could also expect some sort of punishment by the
Chooser. In situations where punishment is verified, the information
conveyed from phase one to phase two is not any clearer. Suppose that
the Chooser observes a selfish proposal and punishes the Divider; then,
in the role of Trustor she can believe either that the Divider/Trustee
becomes even more selfish to recover the losses suffered in phase one,
or that the punishment was successful in explaining the social norm of
fairness and, therefore, it helps cooperation. Hence, we decide to exclude
from the analyzed data the few cases where punishment occurred (8
couples out of 70), since the design of the experiment is not suitable to
understand the effect of punishment on trust and it is not the aim of our
work.
1.3 Experiment’s Details
Every subject is matched randomly with another of the same session
and the couple does not change in the two phases of the experiment.
Maintaining the same couples, we can show the direct effect of the allo-
cation mechanism on a subsequent relationship with the same partner.
The experiment consists of two treatments with a between subjects
design. The treatments are imposed in the first phase, i.e. each group of
subjects plays one of the two allocation procedures followed by a common
phase where they are involved in the Trust Game.
The results of both phases are added up to form the final payment of
subjects at the exchange rate of 1 point = 0.50 euro.
The experiment was run at the experimental laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Innsbruck (Austria) between November 2011 and January 2012
with 140 subjects recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Subjects were
students from different faculties with no exclusions. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
1.3.1 Phase one: Allocation Mechanisms
In the first phase of the experiment, each couple of subjects has to
play one of two versions of the allocation mechanism Divide & Choose.
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The two treatments differ from each other in this phase.
Subjects are randomly paired and the two members of each couple
are randomly chosen to be subject α or subject β. The game is played
one-shot.
Treatment RandomDC assigns the roles randomly. The experimenter
goes to each subject with a bag containing numbers from 1 to 20. Each
subject draws one number and types it into the computer under the
supervision of the experimenter to avoid falsehoods. The member of
the couple that picks up the higher number becomes the Divider. In
treatment AuctionDC, before the division stage, both members of the
couple bid an amount of points between 0 and 5. This range has been
decided to avoid excessive losses in the experiment and it contains the
equilibrium bid of 3. Whoever wins the auction becomes the Divider,
and at the end of this first phase, she/he has to transfer the amount bid
to the Chooser.
After the assignment of roles, the Divider forms two portions out
of the common endowment and sends the decision to the Chooser. On
the screen the subjects can clearly see the personal evaluation of the
endowment for both members. The Chooser now clicks on the portion
that she/he wants to have. At the end the result and a summary of
the choices are shown to both subjects. This feedback gives information
about the strategies the subjects used, and from this observation, they
may or may not change their beliefs about the social preferences of their
partner.
1.3.2 Phase two: Trust Game
In the second phase of the experiment subjects play a Trust Game.
The game is the same in the two treatments. After the end of the Divide
& Choose phase, the instructions for the Trust Game are handed in to
subjects in order to exclude any reputation or signaling strategy in the
first phase.6
At this time, each subject receives her/his show-up fee of 10 points
(5 euros); these personal endowments are used to play the Trust Game.
The nature of the game permits each subject to preserve entirely the
show-up fee in case of distrust, or to increase it in case of trust and a
trustworthy response. Thus, we feel confident using their show-up fee in
this phase because any loss is a personal choice and they are perfectly
6At the beginning, the experimenter tells the subjects that the experiment is com-
posed of two phases and the instructions are explained at the beginning of each phase.
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aware of the risk. An equal initial endowment, moreover, excludes any
choice driven from pre-game inequality concerns.
The Trust Game is presented to subjects using the strategy method.
The task is very simple to understand and subjects can quickly and
easily make choices to use the strategy method confidently. After some
control questions, every subject decides how much to transfer in the role
of Trustor.7 At this point, we also ask for the elicitation of beliefs, i.e.
in the same screen there is a table that the Trustor fills in with her/his
belief about the back transfer of the Trustee contingent on every option
of the Trustor. The specific question is: “If you send to the Second Mover
... points, how much do YOU expect the Second Mover will send back to
you from her/his amount at her/his disposal (show-up fee + your transfer
tripled)?” Our methodology permits us to collect more information, thus
obtaining a different function of beliefs for every subject.
In the second screen, subjects make their decision in the role of
Trustee. They see a table with 11 entries, one for each possible level
of investment of the Trustor (from 0 to 10), and they have to choose how
many points to send back to the Trustor from every possible amount at
their disposal (show-up fee + First Mover’s investment tripled).
At the end, a random mechanism decides the effective role of the two
subjects and their choices determine the final earnings of this phase. The
results of the two phases are added to establish the final payment.
1.3.3 Questionnaire
While waiting for payments, subjects are asked to fill in a question-
naire. Besides the classic socio-demographic profile, we added the ques-
tions of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) survey (Naef
and Schupp 2009) in order to detect betrayal aversion and risk attitudes,
which are the other two main drivers of trust together with beliefs. In this
way, we have the complete picture about which element of our analysis
generates trust in the second phase.
1.4 Results
This section presents the results of the experiment. In the first part,
data from the two versions of the Divide & Choose are analyzed, and
second, we describe the interaction between the allocation mechanisms
7In the instructions and during the experiment the Trustor is called “First Mover”
and the Trustee “Second Mover”.
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Table 1.4: Details of subjects and earnings
Treatment subjects independent obs. average earnings (euro)
(std. dev. in brackets)
RandomDC 60 30 14.07 (3.89)
AuctionDC 80 40 13.99 (3.90)
Experiment 140 70 14.02 (3.88)
Figure 1.1: Allocation phase: distribution of Dividers’ proposals: treatment Ran-
domDC on the left, treatment AuctionDC on the right. The x-axis orders the plau-
sible divisions of the Dividers holding fixed the division of the two goods and varying
the partition of coins. We assume that good A and good B are in two different por-
tions and A is the efficient good, which means the good with the highest value for the
Divider.
and the Trust Game. In the experiment, 140 subjects participated, 60
in treatment RandomDC and 80 in treatment AuctionDC. The average
earning was 14.02 euro (Table 3.4).
1.4.1 Results of Phase One: Allocation Mechanisms
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of the Dividers’ proposals of the two
treatments in the allocation phase of our experiment. On the horizontal
axis, we list the possible divisions of the endowment.8 In Figure 1.1 we
8The whole range of possible divisions also includes the case where the two goods
are in the same portion; for example, good A and good B in one portion and the 10
coins in the other portion. Only one Divider opted for this kind of allocation and we
decided for simplicity of representation to exclude it from the graph, but not from
the data analysis.
24
CHAPTER 1. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ALLOCATION
PROCEDURES AND THEIR EFFECT ON TRUST
assume that the Divider proposes an efficient division, in the sense that
he intends to have the portion with the more valuable good.
The blue bars are the number of inefficient choices of Choosers after
the proposal of that particular allocation. Specifically, here inefficiency
means that after the proposal of two portions by the Divider, the Chooser
takes the portion with the good that has the lowest personal evaluation,
thus minimizing the total size of the cake.
From Figure 1.1, we note first of all the high willingness to maximize
the total value of the endowment of the subjects: only 12 couples (blue
bars) out of 70 failed to reach the efficient division.
In the middle point of the horizontal axis, the allocation A5-B5 equal-
izes the payoffs of the two members of the same couple; on the left side
proposals give a higher payoff to the Chooser and on the right side to
the Divider. Proposals from A2-A8 to A8-B2 are no-envy. Outside this
interval at the extremes of the graph the proposals are envy, and the
Chooser has a monetary incentive to choose the inefficient allocation,
thus increasing the likelihood of inefficient choices.
Looking at the two distributions, we note that the greater part of
the division proposed by the Dividers lies between the equal allocation
A5-B5 and the selfish one of A8-B2; in particular, 76.67% of the propos-
als in RandomDC and 76.92% in AuctionDC fall into this range. The
altruistic divisions represent only minor fractions, 16.66% in RandomDC
and 17.95% in AuctionDC. The two distributions of the Divider’s pro-
posals do not statistically differ between treatments (Mann-Whitney test
p < 0.3855 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p < 0.611).
The two mechanisms are characterized by two different methods of
role assignment; the AuctionDC exploits the transfer of the bid to com-
pensate for the theoretical advantage of the Divider when we assume
that subjects are selfish. Dividers in this second treatment should be-
have in the division stage anticipating the final transfer of the bid, and
the two stages cannot be considered as independent. Thus, the similarity
of the two distributions of proposals of the division stage seems incon-
sistent with our theoretical predictions. If the two subjects sample come
from the same populations the distribution on the right graph in Figure
1.1 should be shifted towards the more selfish proposals given that in
the final stage the points bid by the Divider will be transferred to the
Chooser.
Figure 1.2 represents again the distribution of the Dividers’ proposals
in treatment AuctionDC ; in this graph, however, we adjust the proposals
considering the transfer of the bid from the Divider to the Chooser. For
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Figure 1.2: Allocation phase: distribution of Dividers’ proposals; treatment Auc-
tionDC. The x-axis orders the plausible divisions of the Dividers holding fixed the
division of the two goods and varying the partition of coins and considering the com-
pensation deriving from the payment of the bid to the Chooser by the Divider. We
assume that good A and good B are in two different portions and A is the efficient
good, which means the good with the highest value for the Divider.
example, if the proposal is A7-B3 and the payment due to the Chooser is
2, the allocation presented in Figure 1.2 will be included in the category
A5-B5 (A7-2; B3+2). The lighter colored bars in the background report
the proposal’s distribution without the compensation on bids, in other
words the same distribution of the right graph of Figure 1.1.
When considering the payment of bids in the proposals, we notice
a relevant shift of the distribution towards the left, and it is also sta-
tistically different from the distribution of proposals in treatment Ran-
domDC (Mann-Whitney test p < 0.0002 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
p < 0.001). The shift means that in AuctionDC, 55.88% of the proposals
are in favor of the Chooser (allocation on the left of the equality proposal
A5-B5) against the 16.67% in RandomDC. Considering previous studies
on distributional preferences (Forsythe et al. 1994) and the relevant dif-
ference with respect to the RandomDC, it seems unrealistic that in the
AuctionDC more than half of the Dividers have altruistic preferences.
The main difference between treatments is the strategic complexity, i.e.
subjects have to iterate in AuctionDC one step more than in RandomDC.
Our explanation for the shift of the distribution lies on this characteristic
of the design. We see in Figure 1.1 that behaviors in the division stage
are not different and they mirror the social preferences of the Dividers.
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It seems that some subjects do not consider the auction stage and the
division stage as a unique game, and they are not able to anticipate
the payment of the bid while dividing the endowment in two portions.
Therefore, when the Dividers have to pay the bid to the Choosers at the
end of AuctionDC, they end up in a disadvantaged situation most times.
This explains why the majority of Dividers in AuctionDC are victims of
a “winner’s curse” earning at the end less than their partners.
In summation, the two mechanisms do not differ much in terms of
equity contrary to hypothesis H1. The main difference between the two
mechanisms concerns unequal allocations; in RandomDC inequality is in
favor of the Divider as the theory predicts, whereas in AuctionDC the
Chooser has the advantage in the case of an uneven division.
We shift the attention now to the main aim of our study, which is
the effect of the degree of equity and the information about intentions
on trust between the same subjects. However, before proceeding into the
analysis, we have to define at what point we determine an allocation is
equal. Following the reasoning of H2 and given the wide range of possible
divisions, we decided to classify as “equal” not only perfect equality, A5-
B5, but also the neighboring proposals A4-B6 and A6-B4. All the other
allocations are defined as “unequal”.9
1.4.2 Result of Phase Two: Trust Game
The second part of the experiment wants to find the spillover effect
of the division mechanisms on trust. The main result is that trust is
influenced by equality deriving from the allocation phase, but not by
the information acquired about the social preferences of the partner, i.e.
“intentional fairness” does not affect trust.
We define trust as the amount of money transferred by the Trustor
(first mover) in the Trust Game. Figure 1.3 compares the distribution of
trusty decisions splitting the observations between treatments and with
9Hypothesis H2 considers three categories of proposals: fair, selfish and altruistic.
In the data analysis, we decided instead to group the observations in only two cat-
egories: equal and unequal. There are two main reasons for this: i) the number of
observations for the altruistic category is too limited to be included in the analysis (6
Dividers out of 30); ii) the few allocations deriving from an altruistic decision of the
Divider in the informative treatment RandomDC has a negative effect on trust. One
explanation could be that inequality aversion in this setting is considered as a better
predictor of subsequent trusting behaviors than altruism. For these two motivations
we decided to pool the data of “selfish” and “altruistic”. However, results are robust
even when the ”altruistic” category is excluded.
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Figure 1.3: Trustor’s transfer in the Trust Game sorted by treatment and by pro-
posal’s fairness.
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Table 1.5: Average trust (std. dev. in brackets)
Treatment After equal proposals After unequal proposals
RandomDC 6.07 (2.72) 4.19 (2.36)
AuctionDC 6.09 (3.31) 4.47 (2.99)
respect to the classification of equality deriving from the allocation phase.
On the horizontal axis, we find the 11 levels of Trustor’s investments from
points 0 to 10.
The graphical analysis excludes the couples who experienced the in-
efficient choice of the Chooser when the Divider proposes a no-envy di-
vision; this means, for instance, that the Chooser takes the portion with
good A when the proposal is between A2-B8 and A8-B2. In this range,
the portion containing good B always has a greater monetary value for
the Chooser; if the Chooser in this situation takes the portion containing
good A, she is clearly bearing a cost to punish the partner. It would
be interesting to see the effect of punishment on trust, but only eight
couples (three in RandomDC and five in AuctionDC ) ended up in this
category and the limited number would not give us any insight. The
effect of punishment will be included in the regression analysis.
We start the analysis of the results by considering the two treatments
separately and we look first at the treatment RandomDC (the left column
of Figure 1.3). In this treatment, trust increases on average from 4.19
to 6.07 when the Divider proposes an equal division in the allocation
phase (Mann-Whitney test p < 0.0038 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p <
0.069). The difference in the informative treatment RandomDC proves
a clear positive effect of equality coming from an unrelated preceding
decision task on trust.
In the informative treatment RandomDC, we cannot distinguish if
the positive effect on trust of the Divider’s proposals in the “equality”
category is due to the objective “allocation fairness” or to the acquired
information about the intentions of the partner (intentional fairness). To
distinguish the two kinds of fairness we now consider all subjects that
experienced an equal proposal and we compare the two treatments (the
lower row of Figure 1.3). Keeping in mind hypothesis H2, the level of
trust should be the lowest in “RandomDC after an unequal proposal”
since the intentionality of selfishness is clearly revealed; trust in “Auc-
tionDC after an equal division” should be in the middle position because
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there is no updating of beliefs and “RandomDC after an equal division”
should produce the highest level of trust. The analysis of data on the
contrary does not support our hypothesis H2. The two distributions on
the lower part of Figure 1.3 do not statistically differ (Mann-Whitney test
p < 0.9274 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p < 0.744), and we can even
observe a peak (29%) in the efficient but very risky solution Trust = 10
in the category “AuctionDC after an equal division”. It seems that sub-
jects create a positive judgment about their partner only looking at the
superficial fairness of proposals and not reading the intentions behind
them.
We have seen that in both treatments having an equal allocation in
the first phase has a positive effect on trust. This evidence in treatment
AuctionDC indicates that the positive effect of equality on trust does not
come from the understanding of pro-social intentions, but rather from the
objective “allocation fairness” independently of what the mechanism re-
veals about the preferences of the partner.
Table 1.6 reports the estimation results. Model (1) is an OLS re-
gression with Trust as the independent variable that is defined as the
amount transferred by the Trustor to the Trustee. Following the rea-
soning of Fehr (2009), in this first regression we check the three main
determinants of trust: beliefs, risk and betrayal aversion. The variable
Beliefs is composed of the amount that each Trustor guesses that the
Trustee will transfer back conditional on his transfer; i.e. if the Trustor
decides to transfer five points to the Trustee, we will consider the particu-
lar Trustor’s belief about the back transfer of the Trustee only concerning
the initial transfer of five points. Risk Attitude and Betrayal Aversion
are measures derived from the final questionnaire. In this first model
we control for gender (Female) and for the role of the allocation phase
(Divider). In the setting of our experiment, only Beliefs have a positive
and significant effect on Trust ; in particular, increasing the belief of back
transfer by one point, we observe an increment in Trust of 0.415 points.
Risk and betrayal aversion do not have an effect.
Referring once again to the work of Fehr (2009), the treatment vari-
ation should influence Trust through beliefs rather than directly. This
is exactly the aim of models (2) and (3) where the independent variable
is Beliefs. Model (2) tests the treatment effect indicated by the dummy
variable AuctionDC and the effect of having experienced an equal pro-
posal of division in the first phase of the experiment with the dummy
variable Equal Division. Model (3) also includes the interaction term
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust Beliefs Beliefs Trust Trust
robust s.e. robust s.e.
Beliefs 0.415*** 0.410*** 0.417***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk -0.00664 -0.0177 -0.0208
(0.892) (0.714) (0.670)
Betrayal 0.127 0.119 0.126
Aversion (0.153) (0.173) (0.153)
Female -0.410 -1.496 -1.479 -0.465* -0.457*
(0.102) (0.145) (0.150) (0.057) (0.063)
Divider -0.185 -1.621 -1.620 -0.200 -0.201
(0.448) (0.119) (0.120) (0.398) (0.400)
AuctionDC 1.572 0.928 -0.452* -0.0483
(0.113) (0.483) (0.062) (0.917)
Equal Division 3.118*** 2.369* 0.416* 0.788**
(0.003) (0.077) (0.098) (0.043)
Punishment -0.906** -0.546
(0.025) (0.468)
AuctionDC 1.311 -0.643
x Equal Division (0.511) (0.222)
AuctionDC -0.292
x Punishment (0.749)
AuctionDC -0.00868
x Beliefs (0.842)
Cons 1.369*** 8.162*** 8.503*** 1.665*** 1.396***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
N 140 140 140 140 140
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.6: OLS-Regression. In models (1), (4) and (5), the first mover’s transfer is
used as a measure of Trust. Beliefs represents the belief associated with the amount
transferred by each subject. AuctionDC is the treatment dummy. Equal Division is
a dummy variable that identifies the equal proposals in the allocation phase. Punish-
ment is a dummy variable that indicates members of the couples where the Chooser
punished the Divider. The variables Risk Attitudes and Betrayal Aversion come from
the questionnaires. The variables AuctionDC x Equal Division, AuctionDC x Pun-
ishment and AuctionDC x Beliefs are the interaction terms. In models (2) and (3),
Beliefs is the dependent variable and robust standard errors are used.
31
CHAPTER 1. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ALLOCATION
PROCEDURES AND THEIR EFFECT ON TRUST
between Equal Division and the treatment dummy AuctionDC. In both
regressions, we can see a clear positive effect of equality derived from the
previous phase of the experiment on the Trustor’s beliefs, but there is not
any treatment effect. The two treatments provide different information
conditional on the equality of the division in the allocation phase. How-
ever, from the regression analysis it seems that subjects do not use this
information to modify their beliefs about their partner’s decision. As we
have seen in the nonparametric analysis in Figure 1.3, “allocation fair-
ness” is the unique characteristic of the division that subjects consider
while forming beliefs about their partner’s social preferences.
In models (4) and (5), the independent variable is again Trust and
beyond Beliefs, Risk Attitude and Betrayal Aversion, we test for the the
direct effect of treatments (AuctionDC ), equality of proposals (Equal
Division) and Punishment. The dummy variable Punishment refers to
those couples where the Chooser decided to renounce to some money in
order to leave to the Divider the portion with the good that had the lowest
personal evaluation for the Divider, i.e. the Chooser chose the inefficient
allocation. Comparing models (1) and (4), we can see that the positive
effect of Beliefs also remains controlling for the direct effect of an equal
division on trust. The coefficient of Equal Division decreases consider-
ably between the two models and also becomes less significant. Model
(4) confirms the fact that the variable Equal Division affects trust mainly
through beliefs. The treatment dummy AuctionDC shows a weakly sig-
nificant negative effect that disappears when controlling for interaction
terms in model (5). The negative effect indicates that trust in the case
of unequal proposals is lower in treatment AuctionDC. The possible ex-
planation could be that an unequal proposal in treatment AuctionDC
creates difficulties in understanding the intentions of the Divider, since it
is a strategy that brings, in our case, an advantage to the Chooser, thus
easily attributable to a mistake of the Divider. In any case, the result is
not robust when including interaction terms. Couples that experienced
Punishment are inclined, not surprisingly, to reduce the level of trust
toward the partner, but again the effect disappears when controlling for
interaction terms in model (5).
Now let us turn our attention to the beliefs functions of the subjects.
Analyzing them in detail, we observe an interesting behavior of their
standard error variation. In the informative treatment RandomDC, the
standard deviation of beliefs on trustworthiness is similar between the
equal and unequal Divider’s proposals of the allocation phase (variance-
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comparison tests for every beliefs’ distributions of each possible first
mover’s transfer). This equivalence is coherent with the transparency
of the mechanism about the social preferences of the partner. In the case
of either an unequal or equal proposal, the Chooser infers the intentions
of the Divider and forms beliefs accordingly, thus uncertainty remains
constant.
AuctionDC instead records a higher variance of beliefs in the case of
an unfair proposal by the Divider. An unequal allocation in AuctionDC
creates some confusion in the Chooser’s mind since unequal proposals in
this treatment come from the difficulty of the Divider to recover the initial
bid in the division stage; this kind of “error” seems to leave subjects in
a fog. However, the variance in case of a equal proposal in AuctionDC
is similar to the one in RandomDC. This means that equal proposals
decrease uncertainty until they reach the same level of RandomDC.
Once again, the positive framing of fairness has an effect indepen-
dently of the information that fairness provides. In this case, the bias
takes place in the beliefs’ variance. Fairness reduces uncertainty even
in the uninformative treatment where there are no sufficient reasons to
explain this fact.
The standard deviation’s difference between fairness and unfairness
becomes evident when we consider the equality of the final allocation,
and not the proposal of the Divider. In this circumstance, the variance
of beliefs is lower in the case of fairness for both treatments. The final
allocation is the last screen that the subjects see before playing the Trust
Game; therefore, the good feeling given by fairness is more important
in the trusting behavior than the information that can be culled from
the Divider’s proposal. It seems as though they are unable to use the
information to update their beliefs, but they stop thinking when they
know the final allocation without analyzing how that particular outcome
was reached.
1.5 Conclusion
The allocation mechanisms, studied in the bargaining and the Fair
Division literature, are built to satisfy particular properties of fairness.
However, if the allocation stage takes place at the beginning of the rela-
tionship, we should ask ourselves whether the specific properties of the
mechanisms also have influence on the success factors of the relationship.
We considered, in particular, the cases of marriages and business part-
nerships, where it is necessary to build a trusting environment to enhance
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specific investments. For this reason this chapter tests the spillover ef-
fect of two Fair Division mechanisms on trust between the same subject
couples.
The experiment compares the influence on trust of a Fair Division
mechanism that is theoretically unfair when assuming selfishness but
provides information about the social preferences of the other subjects,
with a mechanism that guarantees fairness leading subjects toward the
same fair allocation but gives up the possibility to read the pro-social
attitudes of others.
The main result of our study is that fairness matters independently
of the information deriving from the equal allocation. The perception of
a sense of fairness in the air acts similar to a positive framing effect. This
generally optimist feeling increases the likelihood of trusting behaviors
toward other people.
Returning to the paper by Bleeke and Ernst (1991) cited at the be-
ginning of this study, we can say that fairness in the allocation stage
contributes to the success of the partnership not only because of mutual
responsibility as claimed by the authors, but also because the positive
feelings conveyed by equality increases trust between the parties even in
unconnected sequential relationships. Therefore, in the case of a relation-
ship that begins with the division of some property rights, the planner
of the allocation mechanism should place a lot of attention on the fair-
ness of the final allocation to create a constructive atmosphere where the
connection can begin in a solid way.
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2.1 Introduction
Workers, while performing a task, are motivated both by extrinsic mo-
tivations, as salary, and by intrinsic motivations, for example their taste
for the task. Extrinsic motivations can be influenced by the employer via
different pay-schemes or benefits. Intrinsic motivations instead are more
heterogeneous; therefore difficult to capture and even more complicated
to steer.
When we talk about intrinsic motivation in this work, we refer to the
broad definition from organizational literature.1 Intrinsic motivation is
the “the desire to engage in an activity because one enjoys, or is interested
in, the activity” (Sheldon et al. 2003).
Our study aims at finding a measure of intrinsic motivation. We im-
plement a real effort laboratory experiment where subjects have to work
for 20 minutes. The task becomes more and more difficult to perform
during the 20 minutes, and subjects have the possibility to stop working
and switch to paid leisure. When the task is too difficult and it takes
too much time, it is more profitable for the subject to switch to leisure.
In this way we are able to estimate an optimum switching point for
each subject that depends on individual ability and productivity. The
distance from the optimum switching point and observed behaviors of
participants is our measure of intrinsic motivation. Results show that
low productive subjects have a lower intrinsic motivation than high pro-
ductive subjects and more productive ones oversupply effort showing a
high intrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic motivation has been considered deeply in psychology litera-
ture2 already in the 70s; subsequently also economists started to investi-
gate how it interacts with performance and effort and in particular the
focused on the crowding out phenomenon. Frey (1992) was the first to
use the psychologists’ distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motiva-
tion to explain why incentives may have counter intuitive effects. Later,
Frey and Jegen (2001) developed the Motivations Crowding Theory to
explain formally how intrinsic motivation can decrease due to external
incentives and Benabou and Tirole (2003) defined also the specific setups
in which crowding out may occur.
Experimental literature3 also focused on the effect on performance
1See Rosso, Dekas, and Wrzesniewski (2010) for a discussion about different kinds
of motivations on the workplace.
2See Ryan and Deci (2000) and Leonard, Beauvais, and Scholl (1995) for an
overview of psychology literature.
3See Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) for an overview of experimental literature.
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due to external incentives. When performance did not vary accordingly
to maximization of monetary income, authors referred to a modification
of intrinsic motivation. One well-known example is the paper of Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000), where they showed that monetary incentives in
voluntary contexts work in the desired direction only above a certain
amount, small incentives undermine intrinsic motivation. The work of
Segal (2012) is closely related to our study. She showed the presence of
intrinsic motivation using unincentivized simple tests. She was able to
connect the performance of the tests to the success in the labor market.
Using really easy tests, cognitive abilities were not prominent and there-
fore the main predictor for future achievement were intrinsic motivation.
Even if intrinsic and extrinsic motivations were treated in several
fields of studies, as far as we know, a quantitative measure of intrinsic
motivation is still missing. With our work we are able to quantify intrinsic
motivation and to untie it from cognitive capabilities. This work will
be the base for further research on the effect of extrinsic incentives on
intrinsic motivation. In the second part of the chapter, we present an
example using a team pay-scheme as extrinsic incentive.
In Section 3.2 we explain the design of the experiment. We present
some theoretical predictions and the estimation model in Section 3.3. The
details of the experiment are explained in Section 3.4 and subsequently
we report the results in Section 3.5. In Section 2.6 we bring an example
of how extrinsic incentives affect intrinsic motivation of workers.
2.2 The Experiment
The aim of this study is to find a measure of intrinsic motivation in the
workplace. At the scope we design a real effort laboratory experiment.
The real effort task lasts for 20 minutes. During this time, subjects
can generate income by solving cross sums at their own speed. These
cross sums are presented to participants on a computer screen, where
they have to fill in the correct answers into blanks. Each of these screens
contains three cross sums. Once all cross sums on a screen are correctly
solved, the participant can proceed to the next screen. If a mistake is
made, the program will highlight the incorrect answer and rectification
is mandatory before carrying on is possible. Cross sums become more
difficult over time. More precisely, exercises consist of two digits at the
beginning of the experiment, and an additional digit is added after every
15th correctly solved task (or every fifth screen).
During the 20 minutes, besides the cross sums task, subjects also have
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the opportunity to opt for the so-called SWITCH-task at any time.4 Yet,
once subjects opt out of the cross sums task they can not revise this
decision for the remainder of the experiment.5
For each correctly solved cross sum participants receive a piece rate of
0.7 points, while in leisure mode, participants earn 1 point per 15 seconds
spent in this modus.
The key issue of our design is the increasing difficulty of cross sums,
and consequently the increasing opportunity cost of calculation repre-
sented by the payment during leisure mode. This design results in an
optimal switching point, which depends on individual productivity, and
moreover we are able to avoid corner solutions. In general, a profit-
maximizing subject should switch once it takes her more than 31.5 sec-
onds to correctly solve one screen of cross sums. This is clearly commu-
nicated to participants via the instructions.
The payoff function, given our parametrization, is for subject i:
pii = 0.7 ∗ cross sumsi +
leisure timei
15
2.3 Theoretical Predictions
Assuming that participants in this experiment are rational profit-
maximizers, we are able to formulate the following profit function:
pii = w f(ei, ηi)− c(ei) (2.1)
Where pii denotes the individual profit and c(ei) represents the oppor-
tunity costs of participation in the real effort task. The first term on the
right side of equation (2.1), f(ei, ηi), represents the subject’s production,
which is a function of individual time allocated to the real effort task
ei and individual productivity ηi, which is assumed to be constant over
time.6 The wage rate, w, is also fixed at 0.7 points per correctly solved
cross sum. We further assume that marginal productivity with respect
to work effort is positive but diminishing, i.e. f ’(ei, ηi) =
∂f
∂ei
> 0 and
4In the instructions the real effort task is referred to as the “cross sums task” while
the leisure mode is named “SWITCH-task”.
5To prevent accidental switching, individuals have to check a confirmation box in
addition to pressing the SWITCH-button.
6This assumption is not unrealistic given the results presented below. We also
found no reaction on the intensive margin in another set of experiments previously
conducted.
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f”(ei, ηi) =
∂2f
∂e2
i
< 0. Maximizing (2.1) with respect to work effort ei we
derive the optimality condition:
w f ′(ei, ηi) = c
′(ei) (2.2)
Consequently, subjects should provide work effort until their marginal
costs, which are represented by their opportunity costs, equal their marginal
return from solving cross sums.
An important characteristic of our design is that the optimal switch-
ing time varies according to the individual ability and it is unique for each
individual. Based on our experimental design, which consists of increas-
ing difficulty and opportunity costs, we assume effort to be a nonlinear
function of cross sums solved of the form:
Ti = αi + β1iQi + β2iQ
2
i (2.3)
Where Ti denotes the time spent on the real effort task, Qi represents
the number of cross sums solved by subject i, β1i and β2i are productivity
parameters and αi is a constant. In general we can rewrite equation (2.1)
as:
pii = w Qi + l (E − Ti) (2.4)
where Qi remains the number of solved cross sums by individual i
and l represents the wage rate in the SWITCH-task, which is fixed at 1
point every 15 seconds. E is the endowment of time (20 minutes) and
Ti is again individual i’s time spent on the cross sums task. Considering
the nonlinear relationship of Ti and Qi our profit-maximization leads to:
pii = w Qi + l [E − (αi + β1iQi + β2iQ
2
i )] (2.5)
Derivation of (2.5) with respect to Qi results in the FOC:
Q∗i =
1
2β2i
(
w
l
− β1i) (2.6)
Q∗i is our benchmark to measure intrinsic motivation. Given that we
tell clearly to subjects that to maximize their payoffs they should switch
to leisure when it takes more than 31.5 seconds to solve one screen, de-
viations from the optimum switching point should reflect the intrinsic
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motivation of subjects. Therefore intrinsic motivation Mi is the differ-
ence between the observed number of cross sums Qi and the estimated
optimum number of cross sums Q∗i :
Mi = Qi −Q
∗
i (2.7)
2.4 Experiment’s Details
In total 196 students, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004), partic-
ipated in this experiment. The experimental sessions were conducted
at the computer laboratory of the Faculty of Social Sciences (SOWI) of
Innsbruck and at the Vienna Centre of Experimental Economics (VCEE)
between March 2010 and December 2013 and lasted for approximately
90 minutes each. The software employed for programming and conduct
of the experiment is z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Before the start of each session, individuals were randomly assigned to
a seat, and subject-IDs were randomized to assure absolute anonymity of
participants. Subsequently, instructions containing the information were
handed out and participants had sufficient time to study these instruc-
tions thoroughly. The identities were not revealed at any time, and any
form of communication was strictly prohibited.
Prior to the real-effort phase, subjects had to answer some questions
to make sure that they fully understood the design of the experiment.
Following these questions, a trial phase was conducted to familiarize sub-
jects with the game environment and the cross sums task. The trial round
lasted for 240 seconds and no payment was made for the achievements
during this time. Following the training round, the 20 minute real-effort
phase started as described above.
At the end of the experiment we pay subjects at the exchange rate of
15 point = 1 e.
2.5 Results
In this section we present the results of the experiment. As mentioned
above, 196 subjects participated in our experimental sessions. Average
earnings were around e14.50 and no show up fee was paid.
The number of solved cross sums was on average 99.30, it ranged from
15 to 159 with a median value of 102 (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of solved cross sums.
Individual data permit us to estimate the individual optimum number
of cross sums and the optimum working time to maximize the monetary
profit, using the model described in Section 3.3. Each participant has a
personal optimal point and we will use this reference as a benchmark to
analyze the behaviors of our subject pool.
In Figure 2.2 we see how much subjects deviate from their estimated
optimal points. Subjects are ordered on the horizontal axis according to
their productivity, i.e. the number of cross sums solved before switching
to leisure, and on the vertical axis we plot the difference between the es-
timated optimum number of solved cross sums and their effort (observed
number of solved cross sums). Subjects close to the zero line maximize
their monetary profit; subjects in the lower part of the graph solved too
few cross sums and the ones in the upper part over provide effort.
Data show a clear positive relationship between productivity and
distance from the optimum point (correlation=0.6659, p-value=0.0000).
The low productive subjects work less than the optimum point; when pro-
ductivity increases effort approaches the optimum point, and the highest
productive subjects over provide effort.
Result 1: The low productive subjects under provide effort
and the high productive subjects over provide effort with re-
spect to their individual optimum point.
Before claiming that the distance to optimality reflects intrinsic moti-
vation, we have to exclude that the effect is due to cognitive capabilities.
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Figure 2.2: Intrinsic motivation. On the horizontal axis observations are sorted
by number of cross sums, the vertical line represents the median point 102. On the
vertical axis it is represented the difference between the estimated individual optimum
number of cross sums and the observed one.
It could be possible that low productive subjects under provide effort
because they do not understand well incentives. Therefore we asked to
56 of the participants to perform an IQ test before the cross sums tasks.7
Table 2.1 reports the estimation results. We use the number of cross
sums solved as dependent variable. First of all, we notice in the esti-
mation that our measure of intrinsic motivation has a positive highly
significative effect on the performance of subjects; this confirms our Re-
sult 1. The IQ test score has no impact on performance and it is not
correlated with motivation (corr=-0.0662 p-value=0.6341).
Result 2: Cognitive capabilities do not explain the distance
to the optimum number of cross sums that maximizes the
monetary payoff.
The design of our experiment is able to capture the intrinsic moti-
vation of participants. Subjects know clearly their optimum switching
point,8 nevertheless we observe lots of deviations, that means that they
7The treatment with the IQ test last for 20 minutes more than the other treat-
ments. The payment function did not vary, but at the end of the experiment we
increased the payments of participants of 5 Euros each.
8We explain explicitly in the instructions how to maximize their monetary payoff.
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OLS
Cross sums
Intrinsic motivation 0.663*** (0.000)
Female -6.902* (0.197)
IQ 0.747 (0.068)
Working hours per week 0.029 (0.878)
Cons 76.39*** (0.000)
N 54
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 2.1: OLS-Regression. The dependent variable Cross sums is the number of
cross sums solved. The variable Intrinsic motivation is the difference between the
individual optimum and the observed number of cross sums. Female is a dummy
variable for the gender and the variable Working hours per week indicates the how
many hours participants usually work during the week.
are maximizing a utility function that is not composed only by the mon-
etary payoff, but there is also a component of intrinsic motivation that
is not explained by cognitive capabilities.
2.6 Team incentive schemes
In the second part of our work, we start to study how extrinsic incen-
tives interact with intrinsic motivations. The number of possible extrin-
sic incentives is vast and we cannot consider all of them in this chapter.
However we decided to start here with a team incentive scheme to give
the flavor of the interaction effect.
We decided to use this kind of extrinsic incentive, since in the last
decades grouping workers in teams has become a common organizational
instrument (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2012; Hamilton, Nickerson,
and Owan 2003), however empirical and experimental literatures have not
yet paid much attention on the theme. Teams in working environments
are powerful instruments for firms that want to gain efficiency merging
different individual skills of workers, but at the same time teams intro-
duce the temptation for free riding.
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80 of our participants had to work for other 20 minutes on the same
cross sums task. In this second phase they were matched with another
participant. The second phase is equivalent to the first phase but in-
stead of earning 0.7 points per correctly solved cross sum, individuals
also receive 0.35 points for each cross sum their partner solves correctly.
Yet, these positive external effects only exist as long as subjects spend
time in the cross sums task. Once a participant opts for the SWITCH-
mode, her counterpart does not receive any further externality payments.
In general, the existence of positive externalities does have an important
implication as it changes the design into a kind of Public Good Game. In
such a case the rational switching point from a pro-social and efficiency-
enhancing perspective will be shifted upward, from 31.5 seconds to 47.25
seconds per screen. This is communicated to participants via the instruc-
tions.9 It is important to highlight that the optimal switching time for a
selfish individual, however, remains unchanged with respect to phase 1.
The payoff function of the second phase, given our parametrization,
is for subject i:
pii = 0.7 ∗ cross sumsi + 0.35 ∗ cross sumsj +
leisure timei
15
where j is the other member of the group.
In order to exclude the learning effect as explanation of the change
in behaviors between the two phases, 60 of our participants had to per-
form a second real-effort phase identical to the first one, without team
incentives. We refer to this control treatment as BASE. Treatment with
the team incentive is called TEAM.
In the first phase, where participants worked individually, we saw
that low productive subjects have also a lower intrinsic motivation, and
the opposite for the high productive ones. In this setting, team incentive
schemes modify the intrinsic motivation of our participants.
The graphs of Figure 2.3 maintain the same individual productivity
classification on the horizontal axis (number of cross sums in phase 1).
On the vertical line we have our measure of motivation in phase 1 in the
upper part and in phase 2 on the lower part. The two graphs on the left
refer to treatment BASE and the two on the right to TEAM.
9At the beginning of the experiment, participants knew that there will be more
phases but they did not know the details of the next phases. Instructions for the
second real-effort phase were handed out only after the conclusion of the first phase.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of an extrinsic incentive on intrinsic motivation. On the horizontal
axis observations are sorted by number of cross sums solved in phase 1, the vertical line
represents the median point 96 (value for the data of the two treatments BASE and
TEAM). On the vertical axis it is represented the difference between the estimated
individual optimum number of cross sums and the observed one. In the upper part
of the figure the difference is relative to the observed number of cross sums in phase
1 and in the lower part to the observed number of cross sums in phase 2.
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As we already saw in Result 1, in phase 1 (the first two graphs in the
upper part), data show a clear positive relationship between productivity
and distance from the optimum point in both treatments (Chow test,
p=0.416910).
The two graphs in the lower part of the Figure 2.3 maintain the same
productivity classification on the horizontal axis and look at the behavior
of subjects in the second phase. Here, we notice clearly that the high
productive subjects do not change behaviors between the two phases,
whereas who was a low productive subject in phase 1 increases the effort
in phase 2 even above the optimal individual point. This effect is more
pronounced in treatment TEAM (Chow test, p=0.0853).
Result 3: In phase 2, the low productive subjects increase
the effort even beyond their individually optimal point; the
high productive subjects instead do not change their level of
effort. The increase of effort of the low productive subjects
is significative larger in treatment TEAM than in treatment
BASE.
The introduction of an extrinsic incentive has an effect not only on
performance, but also on the intrinsic motivation especially of the low
productive subjects. An important implication of this result is that, when
we have heterogeneous workers, extrinsic motivations provided by team
incentives do not have the same effect on all subjects. In our context, they
have an effect only on the lower productive subjects. High productive
subjects have such a high intrinsic motivation that additional incentives
have not the power to increase it further. We should take in account
that, for the subjects that already find a motivation untied to money,
changing the pay scheme may be not really effective.
2.7 Conclusion
Intrinsic motivation on the workplace plays a fundamental role on
productivity. Given that intrinsic motivation is a really subjective driver
of behaviors, it is extremely difficult to identify.
10The Chow test controls the equality of coefficients of two linear regression with
two distinct data sets. In our case the two data sets are observations from the two
treatments, BASE and TEAM. The equations used for the test is Qi − Q
self
i =
α + β1 Qi + β2 treatment + β3 QiXtreatment and then we test whether β2 and β3
are equal to zero.
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With our work we are able to measure quantitatively the intrinsic
motivation of workers. Using a control lab experiment with a real effort
design, we keep high control but at the same time we obtain results that
are applicable to real world situations.
Data indicate that most of subjects do not maximize their monetary
payoff. Our design permits us to estimate the individual optimum point
and we measure intrinsic motivation comparing the observed behaviors
with this point. We observe a relation between productivity and moti-
vation. Low productive subjects solve less cross sums not only for lower
personal ability in calculations, but also for a lack of intrinsic motiva-
tion. On the contrary, high productive subjects over provide effort even
beyond their optimal point.
This work could be considered the base to study the effect of job
design on the intrinsic motivation of workers. In the last part of the
chapter we bring an example of how extrinsic incentives may modify the
intrinsic motivation. Introducing a team pay scheme, we see that the
incentive has an effect on intrinsic motivation of only the low productive
subjects. High productive subjects, that show already an high intrinsic
motivation, do not change their behaviors due to monetary incentives.
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3.1 Introduction
In migration and job flows, self-selection and signaling tools are im-
portant mechanisms to improve efficiency in allocation of workers. Through
signaling devices, as education for example (Spence 1973), employers are
able to assign high skilled jobs to more capable applicants. High edu-
cated also self-select in migrations and sort themselves in countries with
significant wage difference between high and low-skilled workers (Grogger
and Hanson 2011).
Social identity, however, can shrink the potential efficiency of these
mechanisms. Social groups usually develop an identity that creates a
moral obligation of loyalty towards the group. When an individual tries
to move socially upwards, for example investing in education, the social
group could perceive the choice as a betrayal to their identity.
In this chapter we test, with a laboratory experiment, whether at-
tachment to social identity could generate inefficiency in a society. In
our experiment the “society” is formed by three subjects and one par-
ticipant has the power to choose between two distributions of wealth.
The decision maker is linked to another participant via social identity,
the third one represents the outgroup. One distribution assigns the same
wealth to all three participants; the second one is unequal since both the
payoffs of the decision maker and of the outgroup subject are larger than
the ingroup subject’s payoff; therefore the ingroup mate is damaged, and
moreover the total wealth (efficiency) is higher.
The data acquired from the lab experiment show that when subjects
are linked by a social identity, they prefer to choose the equal but ineffi-
cient distribution not to hurt the ingroup mate. Therefore in our setting
the attachment to a social identity generates inefficiency in the society.
With this design we want to represent the situation where a capa-
ble individual can choose between move socially upwards, betraying his
social identity (he generate a damage for the ingroup, since it loses a
skilled individual), and be faithful to the ingroup decreasing the overall
efficiency.
One prominent application of the context just described is the phe-
nomenon called “ActingWhite”. The expression “Acting White describes
a set of social interactions in which some minorities incur costs for in-
vesting in behaviors characteristic of whites (e.g., raising their hand in
class, making good grades, or having an interest in ballet)” (Fryer and
Torelli 2010). The costs derive from the perceived betrayal by the minor-
ity and the consequently exclusion from the social group. In the United
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States, it has been widely observed that black students perform worse at
school with respect to their white mates; the “Acting White” theory is
one explanation that attracted several researchers in the last years. The
contexts, where the “Acting White” phenomenon could be relevant, are
really widespread, however the empirical studies present some shortcom-
ings and there are no control experiment as far as we know.
In Section 3.2 we explain the design of the experiment. Theoretical
predictions are presented in Section 3.3. Subsequently we report the
details of the experiment in Section 3.4 and results are finally discussed
in Section 3.5.
Literature review
The inefficiency problem, that rises from avoiding to move socially
upwards due to social identity, has been studied mainly relative to the
“Acting White” phenomenon. The concept “Acting White” started to be
mentioned in the economic literature from the middle 80’s. The seminal
paper of Fordham and Ogbu (1986) is the first work to use the term;
they argue that the phenomenon is caused by a scarce self-esteem of
black student derived from decades of racial discrimination.
Only after some years, a few empirical studies tried to understand
better the motivations that lie behind this behavior. Cook and Ludwig
(1997) and Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998) are the first to expand
their analysis to a nationally representative sample. The weakness of
these data base is that identity is measured by means of a self reported
indication of popularity.
Fryer (2006) and Fryer and Torelli (2010) were able to introduce an
objective measure of social connection. They asked to students to men-
tion their closest friends. Then looking at the frequency of names it was
possible to understand who is more or less popular inside the commu-
nity in point. Contrary to previous studies they found clear evidence that
blacks and whites link differently social status to academic achievements.
These studies shed light on inefficiency generated by social groups.
However, empirical data are not able to disentangle the pure effect of so-
cial identity from the potential economic benefits of the network. With
our experiment we are able to exclude any other possible advantage de-
rived from the social group and we isolate the effect generated by the
attachment to social identity. As far as we know, this is the first work
that applies a laboratory experiment to this context.
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In the experimental literature our work can be connected to the re-
search on social identity related to status and to redistribution. Already
in the 70s social psychologists understood that individuals link them-
selves deeply to social groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed the
Social Identity Theory to find a motivation for discrimination between
groups. This theory claims that social identity starts to take shape cate-
gorizing people into different groups according to diverse criteria as race,
religion, gender and so on. In the second step, the subject includes him-
self in those categories and thirdly his group is compared to the others.
At this point the subject assigns an affective meaning to his group and
he cares not only about himself but also about the wellbeing of the whole
group.
In the last 20 years social psychologists performed several experi-
mental studies to observe how social identity influences decisions both
inside the group and toward external groups. The method mainly used
is the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel and Turner 1979); with which re-
searchers prime natural identities or create groups artificially. The main
insight from this literature is that social identity is a fundamental deci-
sional driver of individual and leads to ingroup favoritism and outgroup
discrimination.
More recently economists started to pay attention to how social iden-
tity affects economic decisions. The seminal paper of Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000) develops the concept of identity-based utility. The degree
of attachment to a particular social group influences decisions in many
economic areas, as for example in the labor market or politic voting. In
their model, one subject forms beliefs about the social norm of his group,
and his utility decreases when behaviors are not in compliance with these
norms. Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009), in their theoretical model,
moved the attentions to “homophily”. In their opinion, the utility of
being part of a group derives from the mere feeling of friendships. So-
cial identity has been also experimentally related to strategic settings,
allocation tasks, endogenous group-formation and the tradeoff between
more identities. Results are still mixed and depend on the way identity is
formed. In some experiments identity is primed through some question-
naires, in others it is created by means of some tasks in the laboratory,
or alternatively experimenter went on the field to find and use existing
identities.1
The experiments more related to this chapter study the effect of social
identity on redistribution. Klor and Shayo (2010) used natural identities
1For more details about the experimental literature see Chen and Li (2009).
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(field of study) to study the voting behavior over redistribution. They
created two groups and assigned them two distributions of wealth; one
group was on average poorer than the other one. Moreover inside each
group some subjects were richer or poorer with respect to the average
wealth of their group. Each subject then had to choose between two tax
rates. Their design created a conflict for rich (poor) subjects in the poor
(rich) group; for example a rich subject in the poor group who wanted to
maximize his profit should have voted for a low tax rate, but if he cared
about the well being of the group he should have voted for a high tax rate.
They showed that identity makes subjects in conflict less selfish favoring
thus the total payoff of the group. In this work however, subjects had to
choose how to redistribute a certain wealth, but there wasn’t any loss of
efficiency whatever the choice is. Our experiment instead introduces the
conflict between efficiency and social identity.
A natural extension to these studies is to use directly wealth as iden-
tity. The Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) claims that
strength of identification with a social group depends on the status of
that group. The members of a group feel more attached to it if the
status is high. Shayo (2009) explicitly included status in his theoretical
model. The two main component for identification are status and sim-
ilarity; he claimed that “given these two components, an individual is
said to identify with group J if (1) he or she cares about the status of
group J and (2) he or she wants to resemble the members of group J”.
As a consequence, if we consider for example different levels of income as
social groups and wealth as a signal for status, rich subjects should feel
more identified since their status is higher.
Several experimental papers proved that this claim is often veri-
fied. Roccas (2003) created status first through preference over paint-
ings where groups were defined “analytical” or “holistic”; then by a
speed task, where groups were denominated “time speeder” or “time
delayers”. It was clearly explained to subjects that analytical and time
speeder groups are generally more successful in work contexts and also
in personal relationships. They found out that subjects in the high sta-
tus groups both perceive the higher status and identify deeper with the
group. Guimond, Dif, and Aupy (2002) proved the same effect creat-
ing groups of “nondisabled” students (regular students) and “disabled”
students (students with important learning problems at the end of the
primary school). In the paper of Klor and Shayo (2010) already cited
above, it was showed also that subjects in rich groups have a higher prob-
ability to identify with it. In general every individual has more identities
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Figure 3.1: Experimental design
at the same time and some identities could prevail depending on the con-
text. Charness (2012) created two identities in a Public Good Game, one
with a team-building task2 and one simply giving different endowments.
He found out that subjects with higher endowments tend to aggregate
together, reducing the link to the group made through the team-building
task. Beside the experimental evidence, Shayo (2009) brought also some
empirical evidence to support his theoretical work. Both at the indi-
vidual and at the national level,3 he found that individuals with lower
income tend not to identify with the low income group but rather being
nationalistic.
3.2 The Experiment
The experiment is composed by four main treatments where we vary
the strength of the social identity, and by three control treatments (Figure
3.1). Each treatment has two parts; in the first part identity is created
and in the second part subjects are clustered in groups of three and they
have to decide about the distribution of wealth among the members of the
own group. We vary the treatments in the first part modifying identities.
The identity part of treatment Paintings consists of two phases.
The first is an IQ test.4 This IQ test will determine the identity of sub-
2Each team was supplied with a set of letters and subjects together had to form
words.
3International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1995 - National Identity surveys,
World Values Survey (WVS), and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
4The Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices Test.
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jects in treatment Status, therefore to maintain control we decided to
implement the test in all treatments. It does not provide any earnings to
participants. In the second phase, we create the identity of the groups
using the method based on the minimal group paradigm of Tajfel et al.
(1971). Subjects visualize two paintings, one made by Kandinsky and
one by Klee, in five consecutive screens.5 In each screen they have to
indicate which painting they like the most, without specifying who the
author is. According to the preferences over the two artists, subjects are
split in two categories: participants who prefer Kandinsky and partici-
pants who prefer Klee. After the identity part, subjects are matched in
groups of three; the groups remain unvaried for the whole experiment.
Groups are formed by two subjects that like the same artist, participant
1 (P1) and participant 2 (P2), and by one subject that prefers the other
artist, participant 3 (P3); for example one group can be composed by
P1=Kandinsky, P2=Kandinsky and P3=Klee. In the second part of the
experiment, subjects have to decide how to distribute wealth inside their
group. This second part is composed by two decisional phases. In the
first one, they have two choices at disposal: distribution LEFT gives 20
points to all three subjects and distribution RIGHT gives 16 points to P1,
26 points to P2 and 26 points to P3. As we can see from the distributions,
our design creates a conflict for P2, who must choose between an efficient6
distribution that decreases the payoff of his “identity partner” P1 and
increases his own payoff and the one of P3, and an inefficient distribu-
tion that is costly for himself and for P3 but does not harm P1. Subjects
only know the compositions of their group (Kandinsky-Kandinsky-Klee
or Klee-Klee-Kandinsky) and the artist they prefer; therefore P1 and P2
do not know their roles. We ask P1 and P2 to take their decision in the
role of P2 and we tell them that they will discover their role at the end
of the experiment. P3 obviously recognizes his role and we ask him ex-
pectations about the decision of P2 in his group.7 At the end of this first
decisional phase they do not receive any feedback. The second decisional
phase is identical to the first one in the decision of distributions, but we
5The 5 couples of paintings are: Mountain Formation, 1924, by Klee and Aglow,
1928, by Kandinsky; Warning of the Ships, 1917, by Klee and Dreamy Improvisa-
tion, 1913, by Kandinsky; Dry-Cool Garden, 1921, by Klee and Landscape With Red
Spots, 1913, by Kandinsky; A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by Klee and Gentle Ascent,
1934, by Kandinsky; The Vase, 1938, by Klee and Development in Brown, 1933, by
Kandinsky.
6Efficiency here refers to the total payoff of the group.
7We ask to P3: “How many subjects out of 10, in the role of participant 2, do you
expect to choose distribution LEFT?”
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Table 3.1: Distributions
Distribution LEFT
all treatments
P1 20
P2 20
P2 20
tot 60
Distribution RIGHT
Control NI Paintings (Cont.) Status L (Cont.) Status H (Cont.)
P1 16 Kand. = 16 (26) Low = 16 (26) High = 16 (26)
P2 26 Kand. = 26 (26) Low = 26 (26) High = 26 (26)
P3 26 Klee = 26 (16) High = 26 (16) Low = 26 (16)
tot 68 68 68 68
give to P1 the possibility to punish P2. Non-strategic punishment helps
us to identify a social norm that links deeply a subject to a social identity,
leading him even towards inefficient choices. P1 would have a reason to
punish only if he perceives the behavior of P2 as unfair; hence, without
identity, punishment shouldn’t be a threat for P2. Instructions for the
second decisional phase are handed in only at the end of the first deci-
sional phase. Before deciding about distribution, we ask if and how much
they would punish P2 in the role of P1 in both cases: if P2 chooses the
LEFT and if he chooses the RIGHT distribution. Punishment is costly
for P1, i.e. three points deducted from the earnings of P2 cost 1 point
to P1. As in the first decisional phase we pose the direct question to P1
and P2 and we ask P3 for expectations about the punishment decision
of P1. In the next screen subjects find the same decision problem about
distributions as in the first decisional phase. At the end subjects uncover
their roles and we present them the results of the whole experiment.
The effect of identity on distribution decisions can be detected only
comparing treatment Paintings to a control treatment without assigning
identities to the subjects. In treatment Control NI subjects are simply
P1, P2 or P3. As in the other treatments, P1 and P2 do not know their
role till the end of the experiment and both has to decide in the role of
P2 in the distribution choice and in the role of P1 in the punishment
stage. P3 knows his role and we ask him about expectations as in the
other treatments.
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The two distributions differ not only in efficiency but also in inequal-
ity concerns. A subject that cares for an equal distribution among group
members may choose distribution LEFT not driven by identity. To de-
tect this portion of subjects we need a second control treatment, where
P2 is not in conflict between efficiency and identity, but where he can
choose between equality and efficiency. Treatment Control P assigns
the same payoffs for subjects who like the same artist in both distribu-
tions. Therefore choosing the efficient distribution RIGHT does not mean
anymore a damage for the “identity partner”. Subjects that here decide
for the equal distribution LEFT are motivated exclusively by preferences
for equality.
The last treatments Status H and Status L are the same as Paint-
ings but assign identities using the IQ test, without the painting prefer-
ence task. According to the results of the test we sort our subjects in High
ability or Low ability. In the decisional phases we create group of three; in
treatment Status H, more able subjects will be the majority (P1=High
ability, P2=High ability and P3=Low ability) and, in treatment Sta-
tus L, the majority is composed by the less able subjects (P1=Low abil-
ity, P2=Low ability and P3=High ability). The motivation behind these
last two treatments comes from the model of Shayo (2009). He claims
that identification is positively related to the status of the group and to
the degree of similarity among the members. Therefore identity concerns
should be stronger when the status is higher. In treatments Control H
and Control L, exactly as in Control P, we change the parameters to
control for equality concerns.
3.3 Theoretical Predictions
In the theoretical analysis of the “Acting White” phenomenon (Shayo
2009), it is mentioned that if subjects share a group identity, then this
could lead to inefficiencies when subjects have to balance their identity
with the possibility of moving socially upwards. Hypothesis H1 tests the
“Acting White” phenomenon under the assumption that the generation
of identity does not have an impact on inefficiency.
H1: In treatments where subjects have a group iden-
tity, the decision maker chooses more frequently a
distribution that does not harm the ingroup subject,
generating thus inefficiency.
56
CHAPTER 3. ACTING WHITE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
With hypothesis H2, we test if behavior depends on the status linked
to identities, following Shayo (2009) intuition. In our experiment, the
status of the group High is per definition higher than the status of the
group Low, in treatments Status H and Status L. Meaning that ineffi-
ciency should be higher in treatment Status H.
H2: The higher is the status of the group, the stronger
is the group-identity effect.
Besides the argument that group identity is an explanation for “Act-
ing White” behaviors, the literature about social identity and punishment
(e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004); Harris, Herrmann, and Kontoleon
(2012); Hoff, Kshetramade, and Fehr (2011)) mentioned that individuals
expect to get punished when they deny their identity. Hereby, punish-
ment has not to be a direct action, but can be the exclusion from the
group. We consider the punishment rationale in our experimental design
by using a punishment stage in the second decisional phase. We hypoth-
esize that “Acting White” leads to a higher degree of inefficiency when
sanctions of group members are possible.
H3: Inefficiency is higher when punishment is possi-
ble.
The control treatments tests if subjects do choose LEFT because of
identity concerns or because they are inequality averse. Hereby, we argue
that subjects identify with their group and therefore choose more often
LEFT with respect to the treatment without identity. In Control P,
subject do not have to balance payoff and group identity. Therefore, we
should find more subjects choosing RIGHT in Control P. If this is not
the case, this would mean, that choosing LEFT can only be explained
by inequality aversion.
3.4 Experiment’s Details
We run the experiment at the Vienna Centre of Experimental Eco-
nomics (VCEE) in October 2013. Each session lasted approximately one
hour and in total 318 subjects, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004),
participated in the experiment. The software employed for programming
and conduction of the experiment is z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
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Table 3.2: Details of subjects and earnings
Treatment subjects average earnings e
(std. dev. in brackets)
Control NI 72 14.79 (2.31)
Paintings 48 15.09 (2.64)
Control P 36 15.85 (2.74)
Status L 42 15.02 (2.63)
Control L 39 15.00 (2.21)
Status H 42 14.67 (2.21)
Control H 39 15.40 (2.36)
Experiment 318 15.07 (2.44)
Participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle of the computer lab-
oratory and they were identified only by their number of seat to guarantee
absolute anonymity. In the cubicle they found the instructions8
for the first part of the experiment. Subsequently participants were
assigned to groups of three, groups did not vary for the rest of the experi-
ment. In treatment Control NI, groups were formed randomly and in the
other treatments the composition of groups depended on the results of
the first identity part. The group members’ identities were not revealed
at any time, and any form of communication was strictly prohibited.
After the first part, instructions for the first decisional phase of the
second part were handed out. At this point participants discovered the
composition of their team. Participant 1 and Participant 2 did not know
precisely their role; we told them that they can be either Participant 1
or 2. Participant 3 knew his role. They did not receive feedbacks at the
end of this phase.
Instructions for the second decisional phase were then handed out.
Roles and results were shown at the end of the third phase. At the end
of the experiment we summed up the performances of the phases and we
pay subjects at the exchange rate of 1 point = 0.35 e.
3.5 Results
In total 318 subjects participated and earned on average 15 euros
ranging from 9.80 to 23.50 euros (Table 3.2). The main task of our
experiment consisted in deciding between two different distributions of
8Instructions differ according to the differences in treatment.
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Figure 3.2: Frequency of LEFT choices. Black dots refer to data of the first deci-
sional phase and red triangle to the second decisional phase.
wealth for the own group, as explained in Section 3.2. In Figure 3.2 we
can see the proportion of subjects that chose distribution LEFT sorted
by treatments. Black dots represent data of the first decisional phase
and red squares refer to the second decisional phase were punishment is
allowed.
3.5.1 Minimal Group Paradigm
First of all we compare the control treatment without identity Con-
trol NI with the two treatments where identity is created by prefer-
ences over paintings, Paintings and Control P. In Control NI already
the 43.75% choose the inefficient distribution LEFT that gives 20 points
to each member of the group.9 In our setting this percentage represents
the proportion of subjects that prefers equality not maximizing the per-
sonal payoff and forgoing efficiency.
In treatment Paintings the percentage of LEFT choices does not vary
at all (43.75% - Fisher’s exact test p=1.000). Therefore identity created
in the laboratory through preferences over painting is not strong enough
to increase inefficiency. Another possible explanation is that using the
strategy method also in Control NI we are already creating a kind of
identity among the two subjects that have some decisional power (P1
9Experiments using Dictator Games find from 20% to 40% of subjects that split
the endowment evenly (Andreoni and Miller 1995; Forsythe et al. 1994)
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Figure 3.3: Difference of LEFT choices’ frequency between each main treatment
and its control.
and P2).
When instead the efficient/unequal choice RIGHT benefits both mem-
bers of the group, as in Control P treatment, identity leads participants
to decrease substantially inefficiency with only the 20.83% of LEFT
choices (Fisher’s exact test p=0.065 Paintings vs. Control I and p=0.048
Control NI vs. Control P).
The effect of identity becomes really clear comparing Paintings and
Control P. Inefficiency increases of 23% when efficiency implies a disad-
vantage for the group mate. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage difference of
LEFT choices between the main treatments (where P2 is in conflict be-
tween identity and efficiency) and the relative control treatments where
efficiency means also helping the group mate.
3.5.2 Status
Following the intuition of Shayo (2009), we assigned identities to the
groups varying also their status. Using the results of an IQ test we
created groups, in treatment Status L, where P1 and P2 were less able
and P3 had a higher IQ and the opposite situation in treatment Status H.
As the model cited predicts, identity is stronger when the status is
higher. In treatment Status L, the 57.14% of subjects chose the inefficient
distribution LEFT, in treatment Status H the frequency of inefficiency
increased till 67.84%, as shown in Figure 3.2 (Fisher’s exact test p=0.187
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of LEFT and RIGHT choices (number of observations in
brackets) sorted by the performance of the IQ test in treatments Control NI and
Paintings. Subjects below the median performance are named Low IQ and subjects
above are in High IQ category.
Control NI vs. Status L and p=0.036 Control NI vs. Status H ).
Another way to see this effect is to look at the difference of LEFT
choices between the treatment where P2 is in conflict (identity vs. effi-
ciency) and its control where efficiency means also helping the own group.
In Figure 3.3 we can see that when efficiency (RIGHT) hurts the group
mate, the fraction of inefficient choices (LEFT) increases of about 15%
in Status L and even of about 45% when the status is high.
Therefore in our setting, where identity yields inefficiency, a higher
status linked to the social identity worsens the inefficiency problem.
Identity in our Status treatments is created through the result of an
IQ test. A natural concern therefore could be selection. It could be that
high skilled subjects usually choose more often the LEFT choice maybe
driven by some equality concerns. Given that the IQ test was performed
also in treatments Control NI and Paintings, we can now split ex-post
the sample of these treatments between High and Low as we did for the
Status treatments. In Figure 3.4 we can see this categorization. In the
left part we find data of the Control NI treatment and in the right part
of the Paintings treatment. We grouped subjects that performed below
the median in the Low IQ category and the better in the High IQ one.
The labels LEFT and RIGHT on the horizontal axis identify the two
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Figure 3.5: Frequency of punishment.
distributions that the subjects can choose.
From the graph we can see that low skilled subjects are more or less
evenly split between the two distributions, but more interesting subjects
of the High IQ category chose more often the efficient/unequal distribu-
tion RIGHT (Fisher’s exact test p=0.054 LEFT vs. RIGHT for High IQ
category.). High IQ subjects tend to opt for efficiency and maximiza-
tion of their payoffs when identity does not matter, but when they are
grouped together and they face the trade-off between identity betrayal
and efficiency, they completely reverse the preference picking the LEFT
distribution even at a high personal cost (20 points instead of 26).
3.5.3 Punishment
In the experimental literature, punishment is often used to detect the
presence of a social norm, relying on the characteristic that punishment is
costly also for the subjects that send it (Harris, Herrmann, and Kontoleon
2012).
In our experiment punishment is introduced in the second decisional
phase. We have seen that identity is a strong deterrent to hurt the
ingroup, therefore our hypothesis H3 suggests that inefficiency should
increase in case the group mate has the possibility to punish.
Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of subjects, in the role of P1, that
are willing to punish their group mate.10 On the horizontal axis we find
10In the experiment, subjects has 5 possible choice of punishment: 0 at cost of 0, 3
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all the treatments, the yellow squares represent the frequency of punish-
ment if P2 chooses LEFT (inefficient/equal) and the blue diamonds if P2
chooses RIGHT (efficient/unequal).
First of all we note that in the main treatments (not the control
ones) there is a significative difference between LEFT and RIGHT.11 In
these treatments subjects tend to punish more the choice of RIGHT; this
means that even if RIGHT creates an overall higher wealth, it deserves to
be punished by the group mate because it damages the ingroup. In the
control treatments Control P and Control H, the punishment for RIGHT
drops a lot, since now the group mate receives an advantage from this
choice.12 If the reason for punishment would have derived from inequality
aversion, we would have seen positive punishment in case of RIGHT also
in the control treatments; therefore we can rule out this hypothesis and
motivate the behaviors with identity concerns.
Looking at the punishment we can see that there is a social norm that
drives subjects to punish choices that damage the ingroup. However, the
level of punishment does not vary with the strength of identity.
Hypothesis H3 claims that the frequency of LEFT choices may in-
crease when the group mate P1 has the possibility to punish the P2. For
detecting the effect of punishment on behaviors we have to look back
at Figure 3.2. Data from the first decisional phase without punishment
are represented by the black dots, and from the second decisional phase
with punishment by the red triangles. In all treatments the frequency of
LEFT choices does not change between phases.13 Therefore the threat
of punishment does not influence behaviors.
3.6 Conclusion
“Acting White” is the expression used to identify situations where
the link to a social identity brings to underinvestment and inefficiency.
In our work we replicate this phenomenon with a laboratory experiment.
at cost of 1, 6 at cost of 2, 9 at cost of 3 and 12 at cost of 4. In the data analysis we
create only two categories out of these data: punishment = 0 and punishment > 0.
11Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: Control NI p=0.011, Paintings p=0.062, Status L
p=0.015, Status H p=0.001
12In treatment Control L the level of punishment is not different for the two distri-
butions as in Control P and Control H ; however the punishment in case of RIGHT
is significative higher and similar to the level of the main treatments. We don’t have
a clear explanation for this evidence yet.
13McNemar test: Control NI p=0.754, Paintings p=0.687, Control P p=1.00, Sta-
tus L p=1.00, Control L p=0.687, Status H p=0.625, Control H p=0.508.
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We created groups of three subjects where two of them were linked by
a social identity and they had to decide how to distribute wealth among
the members of in and the out-group. To see how identity influences
behaviors we created a conflict between identity, own income and total
income of the group.
In the context where increasing the own payoffs generates a positive
externality for the outgroup but a negative externality for the ingroup,
our data highlight that social identity holds back individual investments
when this means hurting the social identity partner. A related result
can be found in the paper of Hadnes, Vollan, and Kosfeld (2012). They
run a real-effort experiment with tailors in Burkina Faso. They saw
that when workers were linked to a solidarity group that shares part of
the income, the individual productivity drops. Therefore also in their
study we observe that in some contexts the link to some social group can
generate inefficiency in the society.
The level of inefficiency is also linked to the status of the social group.
Subjects feel a deeper attachment to their social identity when its status
is perceived as higher. This emotional state leads subjects to choose
more often the distribution that does not hurt the ingroup, increasing
thus inefficiency in our setting.
The effect of identity on inefficiency is not driven by the fear of pun-
ishment form the identity partner. Punishment does not alter the be-
haviors, however through the amount of punishment inflicted we can see
that there is a social norm that favors loyalty towards the social identity
group to the detriment of efficiency.
A natural extension to this work is to find ways that can alleviate the
inefficiency problem; compensation could be one of those. Coming back
to the education example, when the black community keep its valuable
members from investing on education, it is depriving the whole society
of a potentially assets. The rest of the society could therefore find some
compensation tools that reduce ostracism of the identity group.
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